Laptev Valentin Alexandrovich. The ending.

"Deliver the landing dry!"

On October 14, 1944, our troops landed in the port of Liinakhamari from torpedo boats. There are fifty Marines on board each.
“We went through the“ corridor of death ”inside the bay,” recalls Valentin Aleksandrovich. - The Germans fired from coastal batteries. The pier was destroyed by shells. The boatswain Zimovets and three sailors jumped from the boat into the icy water, holding a ladder in their hands. We had an order: "Deliver the landing party dry!"
Miraculously escaped alive from the fire of German coastal batteries. One hit would have been enough for Kater.

"Goodbye little sister"

In February 1945, our boats accompanied the Onega transport to the island of Svalbard. “There were a lot of our girls on the transport, they were taken to work,” recalls Valentin Laptev. - A German acoustic torpedo hit the transport under the propeller. The ship got on the bottom and immediately went to the bottom. We tried to save the drowning people, but it was useless: they drowned in the icy water almost instantly.
One of the sailors of the boat saw his own sister among the drowning people. This chance meeting was their last. The girl could not grab the end of the rope thrown to her.
- We, powerless to do anything, followed her with glances of thirty meters deep, until she disappeared into the depths, - Valentin Aleksandrovich recalls those bitter minutes.

"I don't need your chocolate ..."

Katernikov was well fed during the campaign: a day 100 grams of chocolate, 50 grams of butter, 70 grams of cheese, 400 grams of selected meat, 100 grams of vodka. But all these calories were blown out of the bodies quickly by the icy wind.
“Pavel Borodulin, a gunner from the floating base, was very jealous of us,” recalls Valentin Laptev. - I also dreamed of eating chocolate every day. He persuaded the command to transfer him to the boat. He went to sea with us once and ran back: “I don’t need your chocolate, I want to live!” We were just using depth charges to jam a German boat. The boat rattled with every burst astern.

A quarter died in battles

In April 1945, the boat commander ordered Valentin Laptev: "Run to the brigade club!"
- The hall is full of people, suddenly I hear my name, - says Valentin Aleksandrovich. - I do not remember how I walked to the podium, I hear the commander of the fleet, Admiral Golovko, saying something to me. I ran to the boat - “Well?”, - they ask, I unclenched my fist - the Order of the Red Star.

And then there was another five years of service on boats in the cold northern seas. He left home as a boy, returned as a man hardened by the war, the sea and the North.
Of the 1200 Gorky residents who became cabin boys at the end of the war, a quarter died in battles, many later died from wounds or their consequences. Almost all of the survivors linked their lives with the navy, many became senior officers, a few people became admirals.
“And now there are only fifty-nine of us,” said Valentin Laptev, chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod branch of the All-Russian Council of the Young Navy.

Vitaly Leonov

Three years of war, our cabin boys drank,
For three years the boys grew up in battles,
Over many, the waves of the sea closed,
They became anchors for eternal ...

These lines belong to Vitaly Leonov - during the Great Patriotic War, the young man of the Northern Fleet, in the peaceful post-war days - a film actor, unfortunately, now deceased. The poems were born in 1972, on the day of the opening on the Solovetsky Islands of the monument to the yungs-northerners who fell in naval battles with the Nazis. - Boys with bows

Performer of cameo roles in the films "White Bim Black Ear", "Sibiriada", "They Fought for the Motherland", "Bike", "While the Clock Strikes", "Promised Heaven", "About Businessman Foma". He played village peasants or all sorts of artisans.
Vitaly Leonov came to the cinema as an amateur. He graduated from the studio at the Theater of the Northern Fleet and later became a freelance actor at the Film Actor's Studio Theater, where he performed in small roles and crowd scenes.
Leonov's appearance was not conducive to the roles of heroes or production leaders, the actor was used mainly in comedies or war films. He played drunks, hard workers, crooks, robbers, soldiers - ours, and German ...

"The Boy was Called Captain" (1973)

"Conscience" (1974)

"We Didn't Pass It" (1975)

"Days of surgeon Mishkin" (1976)

"Eternal Call" (1973-1983)

"Experts are conducting the investigation. Case No. 13. Until the third shot." (1978)

Alexey Leontiev

"Yoongi from the Urals". - Youth scorched by war. Authors of the project: young military correspondents of the Ascension Center - Vladimir Ilinykh, Alexey Baklanov.

There are street children in the South Urals, but there are no problems with them. Moscow street children. If you do, do not try to make contact. What kind of "war" scorched them? A rhetorical question.

From the memoirs of Alexei Leontiev, Solovetsky cabin boy 1 set:

To be continued.

An appeal to the graduates of the Nakhimov schools. Dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Nakhimov school, the 60th anniversary of the first graduates of the Tbilisi, Riga and Leningrad Nakhimov schools.

Please do not forget to inform your classmates about the existence of our blog dedicated to the history of the Nakhimov schools, about the appearance of new publications.

Business card
Rear Admiral Valery Nikolaevich Agafonov was born in the Oryol region in 1956. In 1978 he graduated with honors from the Caspian Higher Naval Red Banner School named after S.M. Kirov, specialty engineer-navigator. In the Northern Fleet, he began his service as the commander of the electric navigation group of the navigational warhead of a nuclear submarine. In the submarine he passed all the key positions up to the deputy commander of the nuclear submarine flotilla. Now he is the head of the combat training department of the Northern Fleet.
Rear Admiral Valery Agafonov has fourteen autonomous voyages under the polar ice, in the Indian Ocean, Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. He was awarded the Orders of Courage, "For Personal Courage", "For Military Merit", the Medal "For Military Merit" and other state awards.

Comrade Rear Admiral, they say that, as you spend the old year, you will get down to business in the new with such a mood. Therefore, knowing about the recent success of the North Sea people, we can say that the military sailors began the winter training period with a "twinkle"?
- Undoubtedly. According to the results of the past year, of the twenty-two prizes of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in terms of combat training, ten were won by the Northern Fleet. So our mood is more than elated. And the honor shown to the Navy requires not just resting on our laurels, but, rolling up our sleeves, from the very first day of the winter training period, to seriously take on the further improvement of our professionalism.
- After the completion of the organizational period, the "flywheel" of combat training in the Northern Fleet is gaining its usual momentum and is already entering a given rhythm. What are the plans of the North Sea residents in the new academic year?
- Combat training always begins with the delivery of the first coursework tasks by the crews of the ships. By the end of the winter training period, we will work out the actions of homogeneous groupings of naval forces, in particular, naval strike groups, naval search strike groups. Long-distance trips to different regions of the World Ocean for submarines and surface ships are also planned. Perhaps, the North Sea residents will have to make several visits to foreign ports. True, their schedule is still being coordinated at the Russian Foreign Ministry. And at the end of the summer training period, we will conduct a gathering-march of the heterogeneous forces of the fleet with the implementation of combat exercises. We hope that by this time a number of surface ships and nuclear submarines will be overhauled and they will become part of the permanent readiness forces.
Next year, the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" will finally leave the shipyard and take part in the naval parade on the occasion of the Day of the Navy and the 70th anniversary of the Northern Fleet. It will come to the roadstead of Severomorsk on its own. By the way, the tasks for the aircraft carrier for the second half of the academic year are serious: it will work with carrier-based aircraft, as they say, according to the full scheme.
We continue to help the "industry" to launch domestic and foreign weather satellites and communications to a given altitude or near-earth orbit. Therefore, it is now planned to fire ballistic missiles from the sides of strategic submarine cruisers both in the field of combat training and in the interests of science.
- The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Commander of the Northern Fleet have declared the new academic year "a year of raising the level of professional training" ...
- And therefore, the main task for all levels of the naval "vertical" is not to improve, as it happened before, the methodology of conducting classes in a specialty, which has already been worked out for decades and completely suits us. This year we will pay more attention not to the number of events, but to the quality of their holding, which depends primarily on the level of special training of personnel, the state of equipment and weapons. And the mistakes that were in the last academic year, we must not allow this. By the way, there were no gross mistakes related to accidents and breakdowns of military equipment. There were minor flaws in the plans of combat training, the algorithm for conducting classes or exercises. And, unfortunately, there is no getting away from this. As you know, only the one who does nothing is not mistaken.
By the way, the naval educational and material base makes it possible to effectively conduct combat training classes. For example, today, using the simulators of the Northern Fleet training center, we can not only create a tactical background for the actions of one ship or a group of ships, but also simulate the situation for practicing operational tasks, bringing them as close as possible to real actions at sea. And in Zaozersk, where the nuclear submarine squadron is stationed, the officers and warrant officers of the local training center themselves have developed the excellent Zapadnaya Litsa simulator. On it, submarine crews practice a lot of combat training tasks, including, in particular, repelling an attack by surface ships, observing security measures when a nuclear-powered ship goes to sea, and so on.
- Valery Nikolayevich, what problems dominated the Northern Fleet last year and won't they arise again? For example, for fuel ...
- As such, the North Sea residents did not have any acute problems with fuel: we met the limits assigned to us. If they cut them to us next year, difficulties, of course, will arise. And above all, with the outings of ships to the sea, aviation flights. However, we expect that there will be even more fuel.
Our main problem is the manning of the fleet with conscript personnel. We are not particularly satisfied with both the number of conscripts and the quality of their general education. Therefore, the command of the Northern Fleet is trying to transfer the manning of the crews of the TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov", TARKR "Peter the Great", nuclear submarines on a contract basis. But this is a difficult question, and not even on a naval, but on a national scale. Since we are not ready to recruit the required number of contractors, and even on a competitive basis. Cause? It is objective: the pay of servicemen serving under contract in sailor and petty officers' positions has not reached the level after which crowds of people would besiege us. Of course, we are promoting the prestige of the naval service in the media, we send inquiries to the military registration and enlistment offices. We are waiting for the result. But again: without an increase in the salaries of this category of servicemen, all our expectations will be in vain.
- In recent years, I have heard complaints about the professional training of lieutenants, graduates of higher naval schools. However, not only that: having come to the navy, young officers simply wrote a report on transfer to the reserve ...
- This year, compared to the past, the number of those unwilling to serve has decreased several times. Why? The lieutenant, having come to the fleet, sees that his salary after the July increase is sufficient in its level, and he no longer has the thought of looking for a new job. And the junior officer now receives about ten thousand, and it is guaranteed, practically without interruptions and delays. And the fact that civilians have two days off a week, so we try not to offend our people: if we have tasks - we work, if not - we establish a normal working day.
However, it is not yet possible to say that the lieutenants come with training that would satisfy us completely. And not because young officers are so bad in themselves. It is difficult to teach a cadet to work with modern technology from a poster. Therefore, much here rests on financing the renewal of the material base of schools. Although some lieutenants come with a baggage of knowledge that allows them to quickly master the already real naval equipment and pass tests for admission to independent command of a subunit.
- Last year, in the Northern Fleet, two flotillas of nuclear submarines became squadrons. Shrinking again?
- No. It was just that the formations did not correspond to the flotillas in their composition. There are no new ships, and the boats are still being put into reserve. Due to the change in the number of forces of constant readiness, a kind of restructuring took place.
- Is it a reserve in case of hostilities, when we will not build a new boat, but restore the technical readiness of the old one?
- Yes. The construction of a new nuclear-powered ship takes up to six months, and from the reserve, the same factories introduce ten nuclear submarines into the permanent readiness forces. It is no secret that boats are put into reserve due to the condition of the material part. We cannot send people into the sea on ships, on which, due to financial problems in the state, medium repairs have not been carried out or are overdue, and so on. Nobody simply will give us such a right. There are reserves of different categories: in one category - the crew is slightly reduced, in the other category - more reduced. But none of the submariners was written off, they did not remain outside the naval service. We do not have enough specialists, we are trying our best to save them.
By the way, today the staffing of permanent readiness forces with officers is 100 percent. And this is precisely due to the fact that the boat, for example, goes into the reserve, and the officers are transferred from it to other ships.
- Is there any more global “restructuring” awaiting the Severomors this academic year?
- On the whole, except perhaps for small touches, no major "restructuring" is foreseen. Unless the question arises about the reduction of literally several dozen people. Therefore, it can be argued that we have approached the structure of the fleet that they want from us in terms of general reform of the Armed Forces. But this is the current year. And what will happen next? It's hard to say. To keep the Northern Fleet in its current "form", it is necessary that the outflow and influx of ships into its composition be the same.
- It is not the first year that there have been talks about transferring the marine units of the Arctic Regional Directorate of the Federal Border Guard Service to the fleet ...
- This issue has been considered for three or four years already. However, the activities of maritime border guards are closer to the specifics of the border service as a whole. I believe that, if necessary, they will all be with us and will carry out tasks in the interests of the fleet. Because what kind of border protection is there, if the question arises about the fate of the state itself? But during the activities of the fleet in peacetime, their tasks do not coincide with ours. It’s nonsense if the North Sea people still start catching poachers. It is a different matter when it comes to joint actions.
Working out interaction is a serious issue that we pay more and more attention to every year. In the new academic year, as in 2002, we will again involve border guards and vessels of the Murmansk Shipping Company, which in case of hostilities should turn from “civilian” into minesweepers with military teams ... And now, I think, there is no need for the Northern Fleet to take on non-specific functions.

The article was published in the historical and local history issue "Theological Spring" No. 9 to the newspaper "Karpinsky Rabochy". Karpinsk, October 25, 2016.S. 4-6. VASILY AGAFONOV - PARTICIPANT RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR In 2014, Russia, and not only, celebrated the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War. Then the newspaper "Karpinsky Rabochy" collected information about the participants in this war. In the same year, 110 years have passed since the beginning of another war - the Russo-Japanese one. And were there any theologians among the participants in this distant war? While working with, in the metric book for 1906 I came across the following entry: “On October 25, the driver from the rural inhabitants of the Bogoslovskaya Volost Vasily Stefanov Agafonov, an Orthodox, first marriage, 28 years old, married to a rural inhabitant John Grigoriev Raev, daughter of Eugene, Orthodox, first marriage, 19 years old. The guarantors for the groom were rural inhabitants: Mikhail Vasiliev Karavaev and Vasily Ioannov Agafonov; by the bride, rural inhabitants John Ioannov Raev and Theodor Petrov Budakov. " I was interested in the Amur mine transport. The search began. And here's what we managed to find out. The shipbuilding program of 1895 in Russia provided for the construction of two mine transports with a displacement of at least 2000 tons (450-500 mines each). They were intended not only for defensive, but also for active mine laying off the enemy's coast. In essence, the projected ships were minelayers, but due to the absence of such a class in the Russian fleet, they were officially called "mine transports." On March 15, 1898, the Baltic Shipyard received an order for the construction of the first, and on April 17 - the second ship, which were named "Amur" and "Yenisei". During the winter and spring of 1900, outfitting work was intensively carried out on both ships in order to begin sea trials with the beginning of navigation. On January 5, in the workshop of the Baltic plant, steam engines "Amur" were tested, and on February 10 - "Yenisei", after which they were disassembled, loaded onto ships and installation began. The Yenisei launched the campaign on October 24, 1900, and on October 31, the chief commander of the Kronstadt port, Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov, reported that the tests of laying mines from the Yenisei were completed and deemed satisfactory; on November 11, the transport ended the campaign. By the way, at the suggestion of the inventor of radio A.S. Popov, the boatswain's cabin under the forecastle was converted into a radio room. On August 1, 1901, the highest review of the Yenisei took place, after which both transports began to hastily prepare for the transition to Port Arthur. On August 15, "Amur" and "Yenisei" left Kronstadt for the Far East (commanded by Captains 2nd Rank VL Barshch and KA Grammatchikov). On March 6, 1902, the Amur arrived in Port Arthur, and on the 22nd the Yenisei arrived. On July 30, the head of the Pacific Ocean squadron, Vice-Admiral N.I.Skrydlov, expressed his opinion about the ships that had arrived in his report: “Both transports immediately after joining the squadron began service and neither the vehicles nor the boilers required any corrections, which should be given credit, both to the Baltic shipyard, which built them, and to the personnel who made the transition to them from Russia. " On July 6, both transports ended the mine-laying campaign and entered the armed reserve. On June 12, 1903, the squadron headquarters developed a plan according to which the Talienvan Bay was blocked by a minefield. Despite signs of an approaching war with Japan, the transports were in reserve for a long time in order to save money. Only on January 18, 1904, they began a campaign and three days later they participated in the exit of the Port Arthur squadron to the sea. On the night of January 27, 1904, without declaring war, Japanese destroyers attacked a Russian squadron stationed in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. During the attack, the Yenisei was in the harbor, while the Amur, as a duty ship together with the squadron, was in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. Enemy torpedoes passed him, and in the morning he entered the Eastern Basin. On January 29, the Yenisei was blown up by its own mine and sank. On January 30, the transport "Amur" was expelled from the squadron to the number of coastal defense vessels, and on February 3, it successfully placed 121 mines in the Kerr and Deep bays, and on February 5, 99 mines in the Talienwan Bay. At the insistence of the commandant of the fortress, it was decided to mine the Bay of Ten Ships with mines in order to prevent the landing of enemy troops in the rear of the Kinjous position. To this end, on February 10, Rear Admiral MF Loshchinsky went there in the Amur mine transport, where 20 mines were delivered. On February 28, Amur, accompanied by destroyers, went out to sea to lay mines on the spot from which Japanese ships fired at the city and the fortress. In an area 2-3 miles from Liaoteshan, 20 mines were successfully delivered. This was the end of the Russian mine laying of mines during the initial period of the war. 717 mines were delivered in Talienvan Bay and nearby bays. On April 22nd, the 2nd Japanese Army began the landing at Bidzywo. The superiority of the Japanese at sea became overwhelming. In order to reduce land communications, the Japanese intend to move the landing closer to the target of attack in Kerr Bay. But there were mines laid out by the Amur mine transport. On April 29, destroyer No. 48 touched a mine while trawling and sank 7 minutes after the explosion. In this case, six people were killed and 10 injured. On May 1, the steam boat "Miyako" touched a missed Russian mine and sank after the explosion 23 minutes later. The explosion killed 2 sailors. After the destruction of destroyer No. 48 and Miyako, sweeping operations in Kerr Bay were stopped, and the Japanese abandoned the idea of ​​landing here. Starting from April 26, Amur was ready to go on production. However, it was dangerous to go out at night because of the Japanese destroyers, and during the day there were large enemy ships near Port Arthur. Moreover, night setting did not guarantee accuracy. The chance to secretly place mines in the path of movement of the Japanese blocking forces was only in the presence of foggy weather for at least 3 hours. To cover the landing of troops, the main forces of the Japanese fleet began a close blockade of Port Arthur. Attention was drawn to the fact that the Japanese blocking forces followed the same route every day. It was decided to take advantage of this. On May 1, "Amur" went to the setting of mines. The transport miners worked flawlessly. All 50 mines were in line. The next day, May 2, the blockade at Port Arthur was supported by a detachment under the command of Admiral Nasib, consisting of the battleships Hatsuse, Sikishima, Yashima, the cruiser Kasagi and the advice note "Tatsuta". The cruisers Akashi, Suma, Chiyoda, Akitsushima, Takasago, gunboats Uji, Oshima, Akagi and destroyers were nearby. Some of them safely passed through the place where the Amur had placed mines the day before. At 1050 hours the battleship Hatsuse was blown up by a mine. The explosion occurred in the stern, and as a result immediately flooded the tiller compartment. Admiral Nasiba ordered the ships of his detachment to change course, but a few minutes later the battleship Yashima was blown up by a mine. The battleship received a hole on the starboard side; not even a few moments passed before the second explosion followed. The admiral immediately sent the cruiser Takasago to the Yashima and the Kasagi to the Hatsusa. The Kasagi was on its way to the Hatsusa to take it in tow, but at 1233 hours this battleship was blown up by another mine. Within one or two minutes, the battleship Hatsuse sank. At the same time, 36 officers and conductors, 445 lower ranks and 12 civilian employees were killed. On the battleship "Yashima" the team fought for the survivability of the ship, but it was not possible to stop the spread of water through the interior. It became clear that the ship was doomed. First, the portrait of the emperor was solemnly transported to the cruiser "Suma", and then the team was built on the quarterdecks. The flag was lowered to the sounds of the national anthem and the triple "banzai", after which the crew left the battleship in an organized manner, which sank after a while. The death of one Japanese battleship and the blowing up of the second were so unexpected for the Russian command that it was not able to develop and consolidate it by attacking the rest of the ships. For the entire period of metal shipbuilding, neither before nor after the Russian-Japanese war, the Russians did not manage to sink a single enemy battleship on the high seas. The loss of two of the six (one-third) battleships in the Japanese fleet was a remarkable success. It seemed that all was not yet lost, and the course of the war at sea, and therefore on land, could be reversed. The personnel of the squadron in Port Arthur perked up. Moreover, in early May, the Japanese suffered other losses - and also from mines. On May 4, the Japanese destroyer Akatsuki was 8 miles from Liaoteshan, where it touched a mine and sank after the explosion. The commander S. Naojiro, 6 officers and conductors, 16 sailors were killed. Probably, "Akatsuki" was killed by mines delivered by the "Amur" mine transport. On May 10 "Amur" was engaged in trawling (undermining mines) in the roadstead. On the night of May 14, Russian troops left the city of Dalny and retreated to Port Arthur. On this day, the command of the squadron decided to lay a mine in Tahe Bay to prevent shelling from the flanks of the fortress from the sea. The Amur went out to sea and the setting of 49 minutes was successful. On May 17, 1904, Rear Admiral Vitgeft ordered the removal of all 75-mm cannons from the Amur and hand them over to the battleship Tsesarevich for finishing repairs. On May 22, Amur put out to sea for another setting of 50 minutes at Golubina Bay. VK Vitgeft considered this production to be the last for "Cupid", since the supply of mines on transport was running out. There was no longer anything to place large minefields, and because of small installations it was not worth risking such a valuable ship. But, having stumbled upon mines, I had to return to the harbor. On June 2, the squadron commander ordered the Amur commander to clean the fairway himself to ensure the exit for laying mines. In Golubina Bay, a minelayer received an underwater hole from hitting a stone. As a result, five sections of the double bottom space and three coal pits were flooded. The mine transport was not repaired due to the lack of mines in Port Arthur, and later it was used as a trawling base. The personnel were engaged in the manufacture and repair of trawls, participated in trawling, the construction of fortifications and battles on the land front. On November 26, 1904, the Amur was sunk in the dock by artillery fire. On December 20, the ship was blown up by the crew before the fall of the fortress. On June 22, the Japanese gunboat (coastal defense ship) "Kaimon" provided mine action in the Tungkau Bay, where it was blown up by a mine and sank. 22 people were killed. The cause of the death of this ship was a mine placed by the Yenisei or Amur. The minefields set up by the transports delayed the start of the operation of the Dalny port by the Japanese, did not allow them to land troops in the rear of the Russian troops, limited shelling from the sea for the forts, the city and the port, made a close blockade of the Kwantung Peninsula impossible. The mine threat narrowed the operational space of the Japanese fleet, led to serious losses, and forced the enemy to spend time and energy on mine action. Of the 1,066 mines exhibited by Russian ships at Port Arthur, 837 (78.5%) fell on the Amur and Yenisei.

Rear Admiral Vitgeft asked the Commander-in-Chief to reward the commander of the Cupid with a golden saber “For Bravery”, to reward seven officers and to allocate 20 insignia of the military order for the lower ranks. The viceroy not only approved all the submissions of the squadron commander, but appointed some officers higher awards than requested. But instead of 20, the lower ranks were allocated only 12 St. George's crosses. All participants in the war with the Japanese in the East were awarded medals "In memory of the Russian-Japanese war." The medal was of three types. Silver was awarded to the participants in the defense of Port Arthur, light bronze - to all direct participants in the war, and dark bronze - to those who did not take part in the battles, but were in the service in the Far East. Probably, Vasily Stepanovich Agafonov was also awarded a silver medal as a participant in the defense of Port Arthur. Unfortunately, nothing is known about his life yet. But, perhaps, descendants of Vasily Stepanovich and Evgenia Ivanovna Agafonov still live in Karpinsk. Perhaps they have preserved family photographs with the image of Vasily Stepanovich, information about him, and even a medal, as a family heirloom. Of course, everyone has heard about the legendary cruiser "Varyag", but it turns out that the minelayer "Amur", on which our fellow countryman Vasily Stepanovich Agafonov, a participant in the events described above, served, was no less legendary. Mikhail Bessonov, historian-archivist

Agafonov Vitaly Naumovich. Captain of the 1st rank. The commander of a brigade of diesel submarines, those that participated in the campaign to Cuba (Caribbean crisis). The interview was taken in 2001 during the preparation of the film "Russian Depth"

Why were diesel submarines sent to the conflict zone?

Diesel submarines were sent to the conflict zone, as the most prepared for this campaign. It was decided by the commander of the Northern Fleet not to send other submarines. Why?

Because nuclear submarines were just entering service. There were many technical problems, and in 61 the only submarine, K-19, suffered an accident. Other submarines entering service, including torpedo submarines, also had many malfunctions.

A decision was made, but there were no other boats. Then, in the fall of 1961, the submarine 211 brigade from the 4 squadron, - 4 submarines, began training, in fact. As far as I know, no other submarines were prepared for this campaign.

And you were appointed to command the submarines that went towards Cuba?

I was in a very difficult situation. It was with me ... Captain 1st Rank Ivan Aleksandrovich Evseev was appointed Commander of the 69th Brigade. This is the former chief of staff of the fourth submarine squadron. And in 1962 he received the rank of Rear Admiral, and was appointed as a special mission commander of a campaign on the "Kama" theme, as it was then called. Kama is one of the sub-themes of Operation Anadyr, which was preparing for the events that awaited us in 1962.

What do you know about the events that take place there?

Unfortunately. Except for some guesses, we did not know anything official about this. Neither in the press, television, nor in the cinema was anything said about the aggravation of the situation around Cuba, and between the USA and the USSR. Moreover, even when we were sent on this campaign, we were told that the 4th submarines of the 69th brigade of the submarine submarines B-4, B-36, B-59, B-130 (the commanders were Captain 2nd Rank Ketov Rurik Aleksandrovich, Captain 2nd rank Dubivko Alexey Fedoseevich, captain 2nd rank Valentin Grigorievich Sovitsky, captain 2 Shumkov Nikolai Alexandrovich), we were told that these submarines would have to fulfill the task of the Soviet Government to secretly go across the ocean, to one of the friendly countries for further basing in this country.

And neither the base point, nor the route - we knew nothing. All documents were secretly developed in Moscow at the Main Staff of the Navy and, apparently, at the General Staff.

We were handed the documents just before the trip. I was handed a large package, a pile sealed with the seal of the General Staff of the Navy in Moscow - "to the commander of the 69th brigade" and there a package was prepared for each submarine separately, also marked "top secret." Moreover, these packages were issued several hours before the release, and they were allowed to be opened only at sea.

Was there a nuclear weapon on board, what were the directives for their use?

Yes it was. Each submarine was loaded with one torpedo with a nuclear weapon. No specific directives were issued on this issue. But, there were documents in the navy, and it was clear to us who could give the order for its use. This order could only be given by Moscow, the Minister of Defense.

Did any of the commanders have any experience with the use of nuclear weapons?

Only one commander had experience in using nuclear weapons, he had experience in shooting. In 1961, near the island of Novaya Zemlya, at that test site, high-power nuclear weapons were tested, submarines, surface ships, and aircraft took part.

Submarine B-130, commander Captain 2nd Rank Shumkov Nikolai Aleksandrovich, fired two shots, both very successfully, and the submarine did not suffer in the explosion, and the commander was then awarded the Order of Lenin.

The rest of the submarines had no experience in using nuclear weapons, but on each submarine, according to the training course, the tasks of using nuclear weapons were practiced. Both the commanders and the entire crew of the submarine received very good training in the study of nuclear weapons and the method of handling them. Numerous trainings were conducted on loading and unloading nuclear torpedoes.

Was there any fear or hesitation about the use of nuclear weapons?

We, as submarine commanders and personnel, were brought up in the spirit that we must use the weapons we had to defend the Motherland. This is how I understood it, and I think that this is how other submarine commanders and personnel understood it. Of course, we had no fear or doubt. And the very experience of firing two torpedoes by the B-130 commander showed that the commanders and personnel are ready to use nuclear weapons. Of course, on this campaign we would be ready if we received such an order. You yourself understand that, fortunately, this world fire did not break out and the Caribbean conflict was resolved by politicians. Reason prevailed over this element, which threatened the destruction of the whole world.

After you took the boat out to the center of the Catherine Bay, was there no fear now from the realization that there was a nuclear weapon on board?

No. I want to say that in general we were brought up on the experience of the Great Patriotic War, communicated with the heroes of that war, and talk about any kind of fear. We went on that trip swiftly, maybe we will talk further about the events that unfolded near the Bahamas. We tried to achieve the goal - to come to the aid of Cuba.

How did the northern boats "feel" in tropical waters?

This question refers to the design features of those submarines that were then. Project 641, it was the most modern diesel submarine of the time. But it was built for northern latitudes and temperate climates. This boat was not intended for sailing in southern, tropical latitudes, and for many reasons ... Firstly; - the temperature even at a depth of 200 meters approached 30 degrees (not to mention surface temperatures), and the boats did not have an air conditioning system. You know what air conditioning is now - it provides complete comfort.

Secondly; - these were battery submarines. The batteries had to be recharged regularly. The storage battery did not have artificial ventilation, which allowed the electrolyte to be cooled to a certain temperature. And this led to a violent evolution of hydrogen, the battery boiled. A 3 percent accumulation of hydrogen in the compartment is already explosive.

How long did the batteries last?

It's hard for me to remember. There were specific cycles for each battery. I cannot say the exact figure. Let's say that so many cycles the battery was charged, after which it failed. The submarine B-130 left with an insufficiently fresh battery. This also brought additional difficulties to the commander.

In addition, there were no distillation units as such. Therefore, we had to limit submarine personnel to fresh water. Talking about washing or shaving is out of the question. The personnel were given - morning tea - a glass and evening tea - a glass. At lunch and dinner, a glass of compote was served.

How did the personnel maintain hygiene? Alcohol was given out for wiping in order to disinfect the skin. The skin was covered with prickly heat. We were sweaty all the time, lost a lot of weight - up to 50 percent. The body was dehydrated.

We were given clothes for the hike - blue shirts and blue panties. Over the shoulder a towel, such as paper. We were drenched in sweat, and the sweat flowed from us blue, because this shirt was all dissolving on our body. This led to purulent prickly heat. The personnel in such a terrible state was dripping with mud. And to breathe, you know, what had to be done. At a temperature of 50-60 degrees, especially in the diesel compartments, which are already full of diesel and oil vapors, temperature conditions were added.

The personnel fainted several times, especially in the diesel compartments. There were people who, for the entire 90-day trip, did not manage to take a breath of fresh air.

In general, these were boats for operations in temperate and northern latitudes.

What communication mode was established with the mainland. And did he interfere with secrecy?

Yes, not only interfered, but very, very much interfered - the regime that was established for us. Each submarine was assigned a surfacing schedule - this is normal (daily). In addition, the so-called collective communication session. All submarines had to surface at the same time to receive signals, at the same time, at the set hour.

The time was appointed - 00.00 Moscow time. But this time in the western Atlantic corresponded to 16 hours, that is, the brightest time of the day. What kind of stealth and how could the boat surface in this mode? By the way, the Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov, appealed to Moscow several times to cancel this regime. The regime was preserved until the end of the campaign.

Some submarines were forced to surface. How far were the Americans?

The situation developed in different ways. The boat I was on, B-4. I stood that night on the bridge, the batteries were being charged, and the tropical torrential rains were falling. We were able to fully charge the battery.

Somewhere at dawn, a strong signal appeared. Apparently they did not fly into this shower. And we evaded this signal. Explosive devices rained down on us, they had a Julie system. They threw several depth charges, small bombs. The submarine was captured by an airplane, and a series of buoys with this system was thrown. The system was based on the principle of echo reflection. But we managed to withstand several bombings, three or four. Very sensitive bombing. The lights in the compartments went out. The explosions were quite sensitive to the hull. These explosions prevented the aircraft from locating our submarine with these buoys. On a signal from the radar, they found it because she was on the surface. But we quickly left and the submarine maneuvered away from the aircraft for three days. They stopped bombing. A group of anti-submarine ships appeared, giving signals from their sonar stations. Now they approached, then they receded (twice). We maneuvered in depth and speed and under the layer of the jump, that is, in all ways available to us. The ships did not find us. Within three days we were able to break away from both the aircraft and the search for a group of anti-submarine ships. Gone, fled - in short.

So you weren't found at all?

No, they found us - by radar, but they could not find the submarine. But we had another case. From the bombing, from the high temperature, the gland of the input in the conning tower melted and water gushed out. The submarine was in danger of severe flooding. You can't swim to the surface, surface ships from above, they could get hit by a ram, and whatever you want. The submarine had to be kept at a safe depth from a ramming strike, it was somewhere more than 25-30 meters, and the conning tower had to be blown up with air so as not to flood the compartment. At the same time, it was necessary to eliminate the water breakthrough. Water could flood the compartment and the boat could sink.

There were volunteers. Warrant officer Kosteniuk closed the hole, that is, he interrupted the oil seal and the leak was stopped. The boat was saved from flooding. For this he was nominated for the Order of the Red Star, but I don’t know if he was awarded in the future. I personally wrote the show. We pulled it out in this state, went back with the same peach compote.

That was the situation.

Other submarines found themselves in a more difficult position. Starting from the Azores, we could not stick our nose out, just raise the perescope at once a signal, an aircraft signal, and so on during the entire trip and several times during the day.

The tension, somewhat, subsided at night. The most dramatic events took place in the Bahamas, when submarines nevertheless broke through these five lines, beyond their blockade line. the boats were in a very difficult position. Fierce resistance was shown to anti-submarine forces. This is the first post-war contact, as they say, nose to nose. We met with a potential enemy. Pl was forced to maneuver all the time, the battery was discharged, and in the end the submarine either went to the bottom - perished, or surfaced. But no war was declared. The submarines did not receive any indications of the use of weapons; they were forced to surface surrounded by enemy ships and aircraft.

Submarines were surrounded by anti-submarine ships, up to 5 - 7, sometimes up to 10 units, they literally took a submarine into the ring, as if they were planting it in a cage, and the commander had to maneuver so as not to get hit by a ram. They fired at our submarines with machine-gun salvos from aircraft. A shower of bullets literally over the submarine itself, that is, they fired from a low height in this way, that is, they did not shoot at the hull, as if in front of it. The B-59, captain of the 2nd rank Savitsky, was in the most difficult situation, and the chief of staff of the brigade, captain of the 2nd rank, Arkhipov, was also on this boat.

I must point out that they first of all went to the ram. Shumkov, when his diesel engine was out of order, he surfaced. They surrounded him and went to the ram. He urgently plunged and literally did not damage the case with the screws. They could cut it in half. But he was very well prepared, acted boldly and decisively, which allowed her to avoid a ramming strike. In general, I must say that the Americans behaved impudently, arrogantly, let's say so, they asked who, what, although it was completely clear to them. Moreover, music was playing, they showed places unworthy, indecent for viewing, burned, mocked our state and naval flag, burned it, trampled it, and so on, so on .... Here are all the weapons, the entire anti-submarine weapons system was deployed to force the commanders to give up their nerves.

But there was not a single case that the nerves of the commanders could not stand it. Technique, I mean diesel engines on one submarine, iron could not stand it - people did it, they were stronger than iron.

Did you realize that their actions were provocative?

We still see how they behave - impudence to the limit!

How did you get home?

They returned home.

In relation to the B-36, the captain of the 2nd rank Dubivki. He turned out to be the closest of all, at the gates, so to speak, to Cuba. He also met with anti-submarine ships. Each boat was passed by an aircraft carrier surrounded by up to 30 ships, 50-60 aircraft and helicopters. You understand that we broke through and ended up behind the line of their quarantine cordon.

The commander of the B-36 was ordered to cross the Caicos Strait, this is the gateway to the ridge of the Bahamas and the commander was already on his way there. And literally at the transition through the strait, it was ordered, like the rest of the submarines, to return to their original positions to the east and northeast. It was clear to us that we were not being shifted to Cuba, but then Cuba. After that we stayed in the area for about a month. Then we were instructed to secretly return to the base. And then, as we have already learned, politicians intervened in the solution of the Cuban missile crisis. And this is fortunately. Despite our contributions to the prevention of this fire, reason prevailed. We were in the Bahamas for about a month. The evacuation of missiles and equipment took place in Cuba. Then at the end of November we received an order, just as covertly, to return to the base in the North.

I have already said that we managed to return safe and sound, despite the opposition of anti-submarine forces and means provided by the Americans, we managed to return.

One boat was in a difficult situation, B-130, ships of the Northern Fleet came to her aid. On this boat, as on all submarines, exceptional courage was shown. And I should note that after each battery charging, they found an opportunity to dive from under the nose to the depth, and again after that the search for our submarines continued. In particular, the American famous naval historian and publicist Norman Poke describes in the magazine "Marine Collection". How they chased the B-36 submarine. Despite the fact that she left them. They were looking for her for more than 3 days. The boat was forced to surface when it was discharged, in full view. It turns out at this time the Americans were carrying out the so-called "Presidential hunt" for our submarines, it was called to the point of exhaustion.

US President John Kennady was informed about the actions of anti-submarine forces, because the operation was carried out in peacetime. Throughout the country, the US media trumpeted the successes of their anti-submarine forces and awarded them orders and medals. I have already said how they chased submarines, there was no heroism. They waited for the boat to sink, and then they watched it and waited for its battery to be completely discharged and float up.

They acted, as they say, decisively, but decisively why, because there was self-confidence that they could withstand the nerves of Soviet submariners. I don’t think they were happy to force them to fire a torpedo at them, but God forbid, nuclear on an aircraft carrier or surface ship. Norman Pope admits it was risky for them.

In general, the Americans believed that the Americans were fully prepared to attack Cuba in order to eliminate the Castro regime. Missiles were installed on the Continent, they began to install it on October 4, and they discovered on October 16 that ballistic missiles were already sticking out under their palm trees. Along with installing missiles, the US government was concerned about the presence of submarines off the coast of the western Atlantic.

The military leadership was especially worried about the presence of submarines directly off the Bahamas. Tough orders were given to force the submarines to surface in any way. October 27, 1962 was a critical submarine-related moment in President Kennady's life. At about 10 o'clock on the 27th, MoD McNamara reported that two Soviet transports were approaching the quarantine line and a submarine was located between them.

The President faced a choice to start a war or not. That is, a submarine could then become the match that could ignite the fire of a nuclear war. Except for us, there was no one there. Fortunately at 10.25 it was reported that the transports had stopped, the submarine was ordered to stop, and no further mention was made of the submarine. That is, if the submarine was there, then it managed to escape. They were, of course, very much afraid of this. They counted 5 submarines, there were 4 of us. Moreover, they believed that all the submarines surfaced, this is not true. "Marine Sbornik" confirmed that it seemed to them. In short, this is the story of the stay of submarines in the Bahamas.

Those who were not in combat conditions, and this was the first time they had to meet head-on with a potential enemy. After all, the US anti-submarine forces exceeded the combat capabilities of our 4 boats by hundreds of times in their capabilities. What is the 4th boat. If in the open ocean they met an aircraft carrier and any ship, this is a terrible force, and even having a nuclear warhead on board.

3 submarines were forced to surface under the influence of the US anti-submarine forces, and when we arrived each submarine was met by a commission that arrived from Moscow. That is, they greeted us gloomily. Although they were stationed on the same floating base "Khalkin" in the same warm cabins, in the same bunks from which the sailors left for this campaign. But, even then, apparently the main goal was to lay all the blame on the commanders of the submarines, they did not want to listen to us, with the excuse that there was such a situation. A devastating order was drawn up, which was intended to blame the commanders for everything and everyone. True, we must pay tribute to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov. he did not sign this order, but wrote that it became known later, when these issues became known, including to the writer Shigin. The commander-in-chief imposed a resolution that the submarine commander could better see how to act in these conditions, that the submarine commanders should not be punished. But alas, this did not end there.

At the end of December or at the beginning of January 1963, I was invited as the brigade commander to give a report on the operations of the submarines.

Then the Military Council of the Northern Fleet listened attentively to my report on the submarine's march to the Bahamas, and all submarine commanders and distinguished personnel were signed by the Fleet Commander. I was nominated for the rank of Rear Admiral. And that was the end of it.

In January, I went on vacation for the past 1962. And the situation completely changed when the commanders of the submarines were summoned to report to the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Antonovich Grechko. Roofing felts it was hearing, roofing felts spreading, it is difficult to name.

Understanding the actions of submarine commanders at the first deputy. the defense minister was not found. Submarine commanders were accused of everything. Although let's say someone from the submarine commanders understood. Moreover, Grechko believed that Gorshkov allegedly reported to him that these were not diesel submarines, but nuclear ones. Therefore, he pressed on the commanders. And the commanders argued that they commanded diesel, not nuclear submarines. Then there were remarks why they did not throw grenades. Funny. But the commanders were accused. The conclusion was as follows. In their place, I would not pop up anyway.

And when Grechko fully understood that he was not talking with the commanders of nuclear submarines, but with the commanders of diesel submarines, who had certain opportunities for action in the area. Then he lost interest. Turned quickly and finished. The commanders were released. Among the generals, he bluntly stated that in their place I would not emerge anyway. Submarines, in his opinion, were to sink.

Such a case quickly presented itself to the submarine K-129, this is the 629 project of the Pacific Fleet. Nothing was known about the death of which for 25-30 years, everything was kept secret, families were without pensions, without any care from their parents, etc. Such an answer was given, a message. Died or considered dead, I now do not remember, in the line of duty.

You see, we returned to the base healthy, did not bring more than a single corpse, the submarines, although they were rusty, were restored by the end of 63.

Somewhere in March, a scientific and practical conference was held on the stealth of submarines. I was the speaker on the submarine campaign. And where did the submarines go. I said it once. To the whole hall, the Commander said: "What kind of Cuba is there, what kind of Cuba. I don’t ask you which country you went to. You are reporting on the campaign that you made and violated your secrecy." that is, it would seem that the brigade commander understood less than the one who had never been there. And a completely different position. I reported to you on the Military Council, which was in early January 1963, my report on the Cuban campaign, where my speech was received with great understanding by the members of the Military Council. Why: Because Grechko hung on us, and in my opinion this load still hangs, that the submarine commanders returned themselves and brought the submarines alive, news of the personnel. If he was in a submarine, he would have drowned.

She was held under this opinion expressed by Grechko.

I was accused that the only commander who does not understand what submarine stealth is, is the commander of the 69th brigade, Captain 2nd Rank Agafonov. Everyone in the audience was better informed about how to act then.

Did Fidel Castro visit you after all these events?

Before May 1, all four submarines were built on the roadstead of Severomorsk. I don't remember if there were surface ships. But one of the Project 629 submarines (missile submarine) was in our ranks.

We met, greeted Fidel Castro. He walked from Murmansk on a destroyer. We shouted "Viva Cuba". He greeted the sailors. We were extremely glad that the leader of the Cuban revolution visited us, because we went to his aid. Having greeted us, he went ashore at the pier in Severomorsk. Soon, two B-36 submarines of Captain 2nd Rank Dubivko, project 641, which went on a campaign and was closest to the Kaikas Strait, and project 629 submarine which did not go to Cuba, were called to the pier. The boats were set up in this way. First, a Project 629 boat was put to the berth, and then B-36 was called. The missile submarine, which is larger in size, completely barred the B-36 submarine and its commander, 2nd rank captain Dubivko. There, carpets were laid on his submarine. He happily lay on the sailor's bunks. And of course Fidel Castro was very pleased. I do not know what and who reported to him, but apparently he ... It's a mystery to me why he did not shake hands with the commander of the K-36 submarine.

On May 1st, Fidel Castro stood on the podium next to Khrushchev, sparkling with the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Some publications report that the Commander of the Fleet introduced the Commander that Fidel Castro shook his hand. This was not the case.

Was it offensive?

Whom to be offended at? After all, guilt, a shadow was thrown on us. We realized that 3 submarines surfaced in close proximity to the American anti-submarine forces.

Does Russia need a submarine fleet? Which one do you need? Why is it needed?

I think Russia has always needed a submarine fleet. And during the Great Patriotic War, the fleet showed good data, defended the Motherland. This fleet played an important role in peacetime, when the mighty atomic, nuclear fleet was created.

That the fleet was what it was during the Great Patriotic War, what it was during its dawn. Russia always needs such a fleet. Because this fleet protects our country.